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SHOW YOUR RELIGION, CLAIM YOUR CITIZENSHIP:
THE CITIZENSHIP AMENDMENT ACT, 2019
Ishita Chakrabarty *
INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, the Indian government passed the Citizenship
Amendment Act (“CAA”) meeting a breakout response of large-scale protests
throughout the country. 1 The CAA amends the provisions of the Citizenship Act
of 1955, the Passport Act of 1920, and the Foreigners Act of 1946. 2 In doing so,
the CAA declares that individuals travelling without any valid travel documents
or overstaying the limits of their travel will not be categorized as “illegal
migrants.” 3 At the same time, this is only the case for Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist,
Jain, Parsi, or Christian individuals who are travelling from the Muslim-majority
countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, or Pakistan. 4 Furthermore, the CAA
states that these categories of individuals are eligible for a fast-tracked
naturalization when they have resided in a respective territory for five years as
opposed to the twelve year residence period for other foreign non-residents. 5
While the CAA itself does not explicitly mention this, its exceptions are based
on “humanitarian grounds” for those who are “forced to seek shelter in India due
to persecution on the grounds of religion.” 6 Nonetheless, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) went on to file an intervention
application before the Apex Court, the Supreme Court of India, on the grounds
that the CAA blatantly discriminated and violated India’s international
obligations. 7 India, however, defended its actions by arguing that Muslims could
not face persecution in Muslim-majority nations and—even if they did—
Muslims could seek refuge in other Muslim-majority nations, hence, Muslims
did not need inclusion in the CAA. 8
*
Ishita Chakrabarty is currently working as a Researcher with the Quill Foundation, Delhi, as a part of
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1
See ET Online, Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019: What is it and why is it seen as a problem, ECON.
TIMES (Dec. 31, 2019).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, § 2 (Dec. 12, 2019).
5
Id. § 3. This is provided that the eligible individuals entered the territory within a cut-off date of
December 31, 2014. Id.
6
See Samanwaya Rautray & Dipanjan Roy Choudhary, UNHCR moves SC against CAA; India rejects
intervention ECON. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020).
7
See NH Web Desk, UNHCR moves Supreme Court against CAA, says it lacks objectivity, not in sync
with international covenants, NAT’L HERALD (Mar. 3, 2020).
8
See id.; Rautray & Choudhary, supra note 6.
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In essence, the CAA grants citizenship on the basis of religion. In its passing
the CAA is vaguely similar to a proposal that was the subject of debate during
the framing of India’s Constitution. That proposal granted naturalization rights
to Hindu or Sikh individuals, irrespective of their birth place or residence, in
cases where individuals did not possess alternative citizenship. 9 This argument
rested on the premise that Hindu or Sikh individuals did not have anywhere to
go but India. 10 while Muslim individuals could seek citizenship in Muslim
majority nations. 11 Another reason focused on the argument that an inflow of
Muslim refugees into certain areas would change the demographics of the
electorate. 12 Therefore, under this premise, a need existed to limit voluntary
movements of Muslim individuals into the country. 13 Although the “secular”
principles of the Constitution are meant to ensure that these proposals did not
make it out of the drafting committee, the CAA is reminiscent of the same
attempt to create an ethnic State. Likewise, Professor Sital Kalantry observed
that India earlier amended the Passport Rules of 1950, to allow Hindu, Sikh,
Buddhist, Jain, and Christian individuals who were “compelled to seek shelter
in India due to religious persecution or fear of religious persecution and entered
into India on or before the December 31, 2014,” to travel without valid travel
documents. 14 She concludes that these domestic laws can allow India to “pick
and choose” which types of refugees it wishes to admit and which it chooses to
reject. 15
But this is not all that the CAA does. Additionally, the CAA regularizes entry
and residence of an asylum seeker purely on the basis of religious considerations
and without any verification of persecutory claims. 16 In doing so, the CAA gives
a green light to give citizenship to individuals without even examining the
degree of integration of the asylum seekers. In this Article, I examine the validity
of the CAA from a refugee rights perspective. I do not seek to enter into the
larger debate of whether the CAA’s purpose is to disenfranchise the Indian
Muslim community. 17 Instead, the scope of the Article is limited to the twin
9

See Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Report, Vol. IX (Aug. 11, 1949).
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Sital Kalantry, India should also accede to the UN Refugee Convention, INTLLAWGRRLS (Mar. 12,
2020), https://ilg2.org/2020/03/12/india-should-also-accede-to-the-un-refugee-convention/.
15
Id.
16
See ET Online, supra note 1.
17
For more insight on that topic currently widely being discussed in the academic circles by drawing
parallels with Myanmar’s or the Nazi-era Citizenship Laws, see generally Express Web Desk, CAA + NRC can
lead to ‘Disenfranchisement’ of Indian Muslims: US Body INDIAN EXPRESS (Feb. 20, 2020),
10
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issues of non-discrimination and naturalization while the subsequent sections
will show that naturalization of a refugee is itself contingent on access to other
rights within the 1951 Refugee Convention.
I.

THE REFUGEE RIGHTS REGIME

Part I begins with an overview of the general refugee rights regime. The
1951 Refugee Convention contemplates a layered rights structure, wherein each
layer of rights builds upon the other, depending on the refugee’s “bond” with the
host State. 18 This “bond” is determined by the duration of stay and comprises of
rights enjoyed across the following stages: while under the jurisdiction of the
host State, on “physical presence,” on “lawful presence,” on “lawful stay” and
on a “habitual” or “durable” legal residence. 19 At first glance, the Refugee
Convention does not make a distinction between an asylum seeker and a refugee,
that it so say, a de facto refugee and one who has been declared so by the State.
As such, minimal rights such as those of non-discrimination, access to courts
and observance of the principle of non-refoulement remain available even at the
lowest level of attachment. 20
Because the Refugee Convention does not distinguish between authorized
or unauthorized entry, States may not refuse certain rights on the basis that the
asylum seeker’s entry was not in accordance with domestic laws. 21 The question
of lawful presence within a territory is generally determined in accordance with
the immigration laws of the State, since there is no such consensus in
international law. The asylum seeker’s presence, however, can also be
subsequently regularized once the individual comes before the country’s
authorities within an appropriate time period or for undergoing a Refugee Status
Determination (RSD) procedure. 22 The interval between the submission of
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/caa-nrc-india-us-trump-6277969/.
18
See generally Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
19
See generally GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT: THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST REMOVAL OF REFUGEES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ARTICLES 32 AND 33 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, 87 (1989) (discussing the rights to identity papers (Art. 27), freedom
of religion (Art. 4), and non-penalization of entry (Art. 31(1))).
20
See UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS (1979)
(“A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils the criteria contained in
the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally determined.
Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not
become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.”)
21
See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 n.83 (2005).
22
See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12
(Freedom of Movement), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) (discussing that there was a possibility, if left
to themselves, states could enact rules effectively denying rights to asylum seekers and refugees beyond the
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claims and the final determination of the refugee status, including any time limits
for appeal, is considered to be one of “temporary admission,” equivalent to
lawful presence. 23 Along those lines, Professor James Hathaway explains that a
host State is under no obligation to set up RSD procedures. 24 Rather, in cases
where the enjoyment of refugee rights are contingent on such formal
verifications, it becomes the duty of the State to carry out one. 25 In fact, to
diminish any attempts of foreign non-residents benefitting under the Refugee
Convention, States establish procedures for “manifestly unfounded claims” that
incorporate a fair trial inquiry. 26
I argue that States should be obligated to establish some procedure at least,
to verify the status of an asylum seeker. This stance is supported by UNHCR’s
position that certain Refugee Convention benefits must be provisionally granted
to asylum seekers only because every refugee is initially an asylum seeker.27
Moreover, if such benefits were not granted, the host State would be responsible
for refoulement. 28 Refugee Convention benefits cannot be granted without
verification of claims because an illegal migrant who remains the national of
another State cannot claim entitlements to rights under the Refugee
Convention. 29 Under the Refugee Convention, once the status of the asylum
seeker is found in the affirmative and the individual is granted a residence permit
or enjoys a stay by “toleration” beyond a period of three months, the applicant
is considered to be lawfully within the territory and is entitled to rights at the
fourth stage. 30 Accordingly, the asylum applicant transitions from an unlawful
presence to a lawful one. 31 Now, to enjoy rights at the stage of habitual or
durable residence, the refugee must have resided for a considerable period of
time in the State so that the place of residence constitutes a “home” and the
return of individuals to their country of origin is unlikely in the imminent

second level of attachment) [hereinafter General Comment No. 27].
23
HATHAWAY, supra note 21, 173–76.
24
Id. at 180–81.
25
Id.
26
“Manifestly unfounded claims” are “those which are clearly fraudulent or not related to the criteria for
the granting of refugee status laid down in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
nor to any other criteria justifying the granting of asylum[.]” Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, The Problem of Manifestly Unfounded or Abusive Applications for Refugee Status or Asylum,
UNHCR (Oct. 20, 1983).
27
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Note on International Protection, UN Doc.
A/AC.96/815 (Aug. 31, 1993).
28
Id.
29
HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 173.
30
2 GRAHL MADSEN, STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 353–54 (1972).
31
Id.
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future. 32 The Refugee Convention usually puts this at a period of three years but
the determination of such residence appears to be qualitative rather than
quantitative. 33 The European Convention on Nationality (ECN) maintains that
the “desirable period” is usually around five years, but under no condition should
it go over ten years. 34
A. India’s Legal Position over the Refugee Framework
India is neither a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to the 1967
Protocol. 35 Although, it is a party to some human rights treaties, India has tried
to cite reservations to certain provisions. 36 For example, India has cited
reservations Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights dealing with expulsion of foreign non-residents lawfully admitted into
the territory, in order to avert international responsibility. 37 Asylum seekers are
directed into a common immigration system, the Foreigner Regional
Registration Offices under the Bureau of Immigration. 38 This system, however,
does not distinguish between foreign non-residents and refugees. 39 Additionally,
the UNHCR operates only on an ad-hoc arrangement basis with the State, to
conduct RSD procedures and provide assistance. 40
As such, the entire refugee regime is left to the State. 41 Authorities, however,
are under no obligation to recognize refugee certificates. 42 Meanwhile, the
immigration laws, like the Foreigners Act of 1946, do not contain any refugeespecific provisions. 43 In this sense, any asylum seeker or refugee stands in
violation of the Passports Act while the Indian Citizenship Act describes all non-

32

Id.
HATHAWAY, supra note 21, 190–96.
34
See COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ACCESS TO NATIONALITY AND THE
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON NATIONALITY (2014).
35
Sital Kalantry, India Should also Accede to the UN Refugee Convention, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Mar. 12,
2020).
36
XAVIER & APOORVA SHARMA, JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE AND INDIAN SOCIAL INSTITUTE, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF REFUGEES IN INDIA 5 (2015).
37
Id.
38
See Ritumba Manuvie, Why India is home to millions of refugees but doesn’t have a policy for them,
PRINT (Dec. 27, 2019).
39
Id.
40
The UNHCR has been operating in India since 1981. See id.
41
For the executive policy of the Indian government, see ARJUN NAIR, INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND
CONFLICT STUDIES NATIONAL REFUGEE LAW FOR INDIA: BENEFITS AND ROADBLOCKS 6 (2007).
42
See generally, e.g., Foreigners Act, 1946 (Sections 3, 3A, 7, 14); Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939
(Sections 3, 6); Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920; Passport Act, 1967 and Extradition Act, 1962.
43
Id.
33
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citizens without visas as “illegal migrants.”44 This implies that refugees can be
detained and even deported at the whims of authorities on non-possession of
valid travel documents. 45 Since there is no uniform procedure, even UNHCR
recognized refugees need to separately make an application for stay visas and
residence permits—which are granted only exceptionally. 46 This is, of course,
in clear violation of the refugee standards on assessment of “lawful presence”
within territory and the accompanying grant of refugee rights discussed above. 47
India cannot cite its lack of a refugee law or non-ratification to the Refugee
Convention for labelling an asylum seeker as “illegal,” especially if this would
subject them to refoulement because that is prohibited as a principle of
customary international law. 48
B. India’s De-Facto Policy Regarding Refugees
With no policy in place, India has been hosting refugees from neighboring
countries for years, including Tibetans, Bangladeshis, Chakmas and the Sri
Lankan Tamils. 49 Refugee movement into India has been influenced by its
relatively porous borders, economic opportunities, and more importantly, the
perception of a “secular” system. 50 Nonetheless, despite bureaucratic claims
raised over India’s adherence to the core principles on non-refoulement, equal
treatment to all refugees, freedom of religion, freedom of movement and choice
of housing, access to courts, public education and administrative assistance
(through identity papers), in reality India chooses to apply these provisions
selectively. 51 An overview of the current literature shows that UNHCR presence
is limited and most of the efforts at provision of a temporary residence is
community based or largely dependent on non-governmental organisations. 52
The State differentiates between the different refugee communities as follows:
(a) Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetans are directly recognised by the government,
(b) Afghan, Burmese and Somalian refugees are declared so by the UNHCR but
44

Ujjwal Krishna, A Closer look at Refugee Integration in India, SOUTH ASIA L.J. (2020).
XAVIER & SHARMA, supra note 36, 8–10.
46
See id. 34–35.
47
UNHCR, supra note 20.
48
UNHCR, ADVISORY OPINION ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL
7 (2007).
49
Manuvie, supra note 38.
50
XAVIER & SHARMA, supra note 36, at 4.
51
Prabodh Saxena, Creating legal space for Refugees in India, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 246, 253–54
(2007).
52
MARY B. MORAND & JEFF CRISP, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND
EVALUATION SERVICE (PDES), DESTINATION DELHI: A REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNHCR’S URBAN
REFUGEE POLICY IN INDIA’S CAPITAL CITY 11–12 (July 2013).
45
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the government is under no obligation to recognise them, whereas (c) Chin
refugees who have already settled in the north-eastern belt (despite assimilation)
are still not recognised as refugees. 53 More on these groups below.
1. Experiencing Favorable Standards of Treatment
For political reasons, Tibetan refugees who entered India between 1950 and
1987 have not only received humanitarian assistance but have also obtained
registration certificates for international travel. 54 Additionally, their children
qualify for Indian citizenship. 55 In 2014, the government also announced a
rehabilitation policy to facilitate the renewal of their lease agreements and
provide greater opportunities of entry into work, availing of loans, and access to
public relief. 56 Similarly, Nepali Bhutanese refugees have received “quasicitizen” rights. 57 The Nepali Bhutanese refuges are legally authorized as per
bilateral arrangements to enter and reside, study, and work without identity
documents. 58 Meanwhile, under the Citizenship Amendment 2000, India
explicitly provides support to refugees coming from Pakistan into the Indian
Border states of Gujarat and Rajasthan. 59 For a comparison, when it comes to
the Sri Lankan Tamil individuals, however, despite recognition from the
government, they have not been able to integrate even after twenty years of
residence. 60
2. Experiencing Unfair Standards of Treatment
There is no provision for the other refugee groups. Palestinian, Somalian,
Afghan and Burmese individuals are completely reliant on UNHCR assistance,
although Chin refugees have managed to obtain long term visas. 61 While varying
communities face issues accessing basic rights to work, primary education, and
health care, the India has declared the stateless Rohingya community from
Myanmar as “illegal” en masse. 62 Several members of the Rohingya community
in India have been detained over orders from Foreigners Tribunals, for entering
the country without papers in clear violation of the Refugee Convention’s
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

XAVIER & SHARMA, supra note 36, at 18–19.
See id. at 19–21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 24–25.
Id.
Id. at 38–40.
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW NETWORK, REPORT OF REFUGEE POPULATIONS IN INDIA 2 (2007).
See id. at 2, 12–16.
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prohibition on criminalizing entry discussed earlier. 63 On October 2018, India
began its deportation of a group of Rohingya refugees through an Apex Court
monitored process, even as it was argued that this was in violation of the
principle of non-refoulement. 64 In coming to its decision, the Court was
prompted by reasons of “national security,” even when a United Nations fact
finding mission came to a conclusion that Myanmar continued to act with a
genocidal intent. 65 For more perspective, these were refugees who had been
expressly identified by UNHCR as so—and not merely asylum seekers. That is,
their protection needs had already been identified. 66 This judgment is a complete
turn from the Apex Court’s earlier position where it had observed the positive
duty of the State towards refugees despite India not being a party to the Refugee
Convention. 67 In that case, the Court had stated that, “by refusing to forward
their applications, the Chakmas are denied rights, constitutional and statutory,
to be considered for being registered as citizens of India. If a person satisfies the
requirements of Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, he/she can be registered as a
citizen of India.” 68
II. THE PROHIBITION ON NON-DISCRIMINATION: FROM ENTRY TO
NATURALIZATION
Turning to refugee standards of treatment, the Refugee Convention
distinguishes between absolute rights and qualified rights. 69 Absolute rights do
not have comparable provisions under other human rights treaties and include
rights such as the right to administrative assistance and travel documents, rights
not to be subjected to expulsion arbitrarily or in violation of the principle of nonrefoulement, and the right not to be penalized on account of unauthorized
entry. 70 On the other hand, qualified rights are usually measured in comparison
to another standard, whether of a citizen, a national of a most-favored nation, or

63
India: 7 Rohingya Deported to Myanmar, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2018/10/04/india-7-rohingya-deported-myanmar
64
Id.
65
Sobhapati Samom & Sadiq Naqvi, 7 Rohingya Refugees Deported to Myanmar after Supreme Court
refuses to Intervene, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018) (explaining that a three-judge bench headed by thenChief Justice Ranjan Gogoi refused to stop the deportation of seven Rohingya community members who had
been detained in the Silchar Central Jail in Assam since 2012).
66
UNHCR seeking clarification from India over returns of Rohingya, UNHCR: PRESS RELEASES (Jan. 4,
2019).
67
National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 83 AIR 1234 (1996) (India).
68
See id.
69
UNHCR, COMMENTARY ON THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 1951 ARTICLES 2-11, 13-37 (1997).
70
See generally NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, THE OBLIGATIONS OF STATES TOWARDS REFUGEES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON (2016).
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an foreign non-resident. 71 These standards are a direct product of Articles 6 and
7. Article 6 ensures that, while making certain considerations or determining
qualifications, the host State does not subject refugees to fulfill requirements
that would be impossible by the very nature of their condition. 72 Article 7 takes
account of “reciprocity agreements” that offer a preferential standard of
treatment to foreign non-resident nationals of certain countries. 73 It reflects the
understanding that unlike nationals, refugees do not enjoy the protection, or
“effective” protection, of their own State and hence, host States are required to
at least extend the same standards of treatment that they accord to any foreign
non-resident generally.
At the same time, there are no distinctions between refugees per se. The
above-mentioned standards of treatment prove that for extending any
preferential treatment to a certain class of people, distinctions can be validly
drawn between citizens and refugees, and between nationals of certain States
and refugees which arise out of the host State’s other international obligations. 74
However, distinction cannot be made between classes of refugees themselves.
This inference is supported by Article 3 provision on non-discrimination. The
Refugee Convention’s description of “discrimination” includes the exclusion
and the grant of privileges to certain categories as opposed to others and without
any reasonable basis. 75 The drafting history further shows that this prohibition
on discrimination was not limited to those refugees who had already entered the
territory. Member States recognized that any proposed limitation to refugees
“within the territory” would allow their contemporaries to alter their
immigration policies to suit their preferences. 76 This implies that a State’s
domestic laws cannot discriminate between asylum seekers, either at the level
of entry or at subsequent levels, including during naturalization. Professor
Hathaway also subscribes to the view that rights—including those relating to
assimilation within the host State—cannot be withheld from a subset of
refugees—unless based on concrete grounds of national security. 77 Article 3 of
the Refugee Convention is further strengthened by Articles 2(1) and Article 26

71

ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE UNHCR, COMMENTARY ON
23 (1997).
72
See id.
73
Id.
74
Although the criterion for such distinction requires there to be a legitimate state objective and the
discriminatory measure must be proportionate to it. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
The Rights of Non-Citizens, HR/PUB/06/11 (2006).
75
HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 245.
76
Id. at 245–46.
77
Id. at 154–56 (discussing that even grounds of “national security” cannot be too broadly worded).

THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 1951
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of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 78 The latter
two call for a sweeping prohibition on discrimination in the application of the
Refugee Convention provisions and in the enactment and application of
domestic laws over those within its territory—including foreign non-residents
and stateless persons. 79 The only restrictions allowed to be lawfully imposed
upon non-citizens under the ICCPR are those relating to the exercise of political
rights and the restriction of rights of freedom of movement and residence to
those lawfully within the territory. 80 This impliedly includes refugees but not
necessarily asylum seekers who have neither submitted themselves before the
authorities, nor for RSD procedures. 81
The standards under the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) are more stringent since they
explicitly rule out distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and preferential
treatments amongst non-citizens on the basis of race, descent, ethnicity,
nationality and also, religious groups. 82 The Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the body that monitors the implementation of
the ICERD. As such, Hathaway has observed that all States must apply
international and regional standards equally with respect to asylum seekers,
regardless of their nationalities. 83 Hathaway finds this to be the case especially
true in the context of the U.S. practice of dealing unfavorably with asylum
applications from Haiti, while at the same time extending privileged treatment
to those from Cuba. 84
Meanwhile, India is prohibited under international laws from extending
preferential treatments to certain asylum seekers both at the stages of entry and
naturalization. 85 India does not have a separate refugee regime and the
introduction of the CAA leads to further questions of legal uncertainty. 86
Asylum seekers, who by their very nature do not possess legal documentation,
78
See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The
Position of Aliens Under the Covenant (Apr. 11, 1986).
79
See id.
80
See G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), annex, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (Dec. 16,
1966).
81
See id.
82
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), annex, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, (Dec. 21, 1995).
83
See HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 239.
84
Id.
85
See generally Hamsa Vijayaraghavan, Gaps in India’s Treatment of Refugees and Vulnerable Internal
Migrants Are Exposed by the Pandemic, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sep. 10, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.
org/article/gaps-india-refugees-vulnerable-internal-migrants-pandemic.
86
Mia Swart, Does CAA comply with India’s human rights obligations?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 2020).
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will neither be able to gain entry without the additional humiliation of being
marked as an “illegal migrant” and penalization, nor will they be able to apply
for naturalization. 87 This is what will happen unless the individual belongs to
one of the privileged religious communities—in which case not only will their
entry be regularized, but they will also stand to be naturalized.
Next, Part III deals with the concept of a “genuine link” for an internationally
recognizable grant of nationality, the implications of naturalization for refugees,
and the exceptional conditions under which they are granted and assert.
Considering that for a “genuine link” to arise, refugees must pass through all
stages of attachment contemplated under the Convention. 88 In other words, they
must have legally and habitually resided in India long before considered for
naturalization.
III. NATURALIZATION AND THE CONFERMENT OF NATIONALITY
On one hand, the concepts of Nationality have been described as the “right
to have rights.” 89 On the other hand, a denial of Nationality has been equated
with a denial of juridical personality, since it allows states to disregard the
individual as being a subject of rights either relative to the state itself or to other
individuals. 90 Even individuals with permanent residence status do not enjoy a
complete “right to enter and reside within a country.” 91 Unlike citizens, residents
do not generally enjoy political rights, despite their close ties with the state. 92
As such, the concepts of Nationality or Citizenship are the last step into full
integration within the society and are, therefore, preceded by several steps such
as legal residence, admittance into the workforce, and social security, among
other circumstances. 93 The following sections are meant to show that the grant
of the highest right is subject to the most exacting requirements—one cannot
demand less for the acquisition of nationality as compared to that required for
the acquisition of a residence. 94

87
88
89

Id.
See generally Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
ALISON KESBY, THE RIGHT TO HAVE RIGHTS: CITIZENSHIP, HUMANITY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 62

(2012).
90
Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130, para.
178–79 (2005).
91
See generally Rifat Fareed, India’s New Residence Law Triggers Fury in Kashmir, Unbiased
information for free minds, DEUTSCHE WELLE (April 4, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/indias-new-residencelaw-triggers-fury-in-kashmir/a-53015259.
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A. The Nottebohm Judgement and the “Genuine Link”
The Nottebohm judgement is described as a seminal case on the criteria
involved in the conferment of nationality. 95 In this case, the ICJ addressed
questions regarding the exercise of diplomatic powers by Lichtenstein in
instituting proceedings against Guatemala over the arrest, detention, expulsion
and appropriation of a Frederick Nottebohm’s immovable property. 96
Guatemala’s objection to the institution of the proceedings eventually led to the
court addressing the question: whether Nottebohm’s naturalization to acquire
the citizenship of Lichtenstein, while he was still a national of Germany, violated
international law? Guatemala argued that since there was no “durable link”
between the nation and Nottebohm, he could not have foregone or at least validly
foregone his German nationality. 97
The court appreciated the facts that Nottebohm was a German national by
birth, who had been residing and conducting his business in Guatemala since
1905, when he on one of his visits to Hamburg in 1939, applied for his
naturalization in Lichtenstein. 98 The application was granted despite the nonfulfilment of conditions of a three-year residence period, certificate of good
conduct, proof of property and income in the Principality of Liechtenstein. Even
the discretionary power to grant citizenship was exercised without any enquiry. 99
The Court did not deny that Lichtenstein had the sole right to determine who its
nationals were in accordance with its own legislation and government organs. 100
At the same time, the Court reasoned that this was solely because nationality
generally has effects within the same legal system- in the determination of rights
granted and duties imposed. 101 Yet, the Court did agree that Guatemala was
under no such obligation to acknowledge the conferral of nationality, since
exercise of diplomatic protection in favour of an individual was an exercise
within the international domain. 102
The Court went to explain that Nationality is truly said to exist only on the
establishment of a “real and effective” link between the individual and the

95
Robert Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of
Nationality, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2009).
96
Nottebohm case (Liech. v. Guat.) (second phase), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 1 (Apr. 6).
97
Id. at 9–12 (contending that Nottebohm had tried to acquire the citizenship only fraudulently and
without any genuine intention, only to become a neutral national during the WWII when Germany went to war).
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See id.
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Id. at 13–14.
100
See id.
101
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Id. at 20–21.
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state. 103 Rather, it is a matter of the individual’s factual ties with the state, and
determination of whether it is stronger than his ties with others. 104 This can be
assessed on factors including, habitual residence, centre of interests and
participation in the public life of the state, his own or his children’s attachment
to the state or existence of family ties. 105 These criteria are also generally
reflected in a State’s naturalization laws. 106
1. Preferential Grants on Ethnic or Nationality Basis?
Professor Crawford has suggested that residency or membership in ethnic
groups associated with a State could be a sufficient indicator of a genuine link. 107
Additionally, States are required to abstain from any “extraterritorial” and
“collective” naturalizations, where they grant citizenship to persons sharing
certain characteristics (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.) living in another
country. 108 The Llubjana Guidelines and the Bolzano Recommendations also
stress that a State has the discretion to consider linguistic, cultural, familial, and
historical ties favorably while granting citizenship. 109 However, the State should
not grant citizenship in a manner that does not respect territorial integrity,
sovereignty and good relations amongst countries, including through grants en
masse. 110 For instance, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
previously found proposed amendments to the Costa Rican constitution nondiscriminatory where it sought to allow facilitated acquisition for nationals of
the other Central American countries, Spaniards and Ibero-Americans. 111 It
reached this decision on the ground that they “share much closer historical,
cultural and spiritual bonds with the people of Costa Rica” and will be “more
easily and more rapidly assimilated within the national community.”112 The
Court’s Opinion shows that while evaluating applications, States are allowed
considerable discretion in favourably treating applications where the individual

103
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See id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 22–23.
107
JAMES R. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 514 (2012); see also
ILC, DRAFT ARTICLES ON DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (2006).
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ILC, DRAFT ARTICLES ON DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (2006).
109
See generally Thematic Recommendations and Guidelines, OSCE, https://www.osce.org/hcnm/
thematic-recommendations-and-guidelines.
110
See OSCE, LJUBLJANA GUIDELINES ON INTEGRATION OF DIVERSE SOCIETIES 42 (Nov. 2012); OSCE,
BOLZANO RECOMMENDATIONS ON NATIONAL MINORITIES AND INTER STATE RELATIONS 7 (2008).
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Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory
Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 60 (Jan. 19, 1984).
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stands a greater chance of integration in the applicant state. 113 At the same time,
ethnic ties alone are not sufficient to establish a genuine link. 114 They must be
supplemented with residential links.
Further instances of a genuine link could also be drawn from the Human
Rights Council’s (HRC) clarification on the right to return and the duty of certain
states to admit under Article 12(4) of the ICCPR. The provision discusses that
apart from nationals, foreign non-residents who have “special ties” with the
country, could include: (a) those nationals who had been stripped of their
nationality, or (b) those who were nationals of countries that have undergone
succession or have been incorporated into another, depriving them of a
nationality, (c) those with a long term residence in the country, (d) or those who
had been forcibly deported on an earlier occasion. 115 For example, German law
allows for a privileged form of citizenship acquisition through readmission to
those who had fled from Germany post the 1950s due to persecution. 116 Upon
admission, they are granted rights to permanent residency and eventually are
treated as repatriates. 117 But this provision is not applicable for the second or
third generation of expelled persons notwithstanding any historical ties, 118 since
they continue to remain nationals of other states.
B. Naturalization within the Refugee Convention
Naturalization refers to the process that offers a refugee the possibility of
remaining in the country of asylum indefinitely and to fully participate in the
socio-economic and cultural life of the community. 119 Naturalization requires
the refugee to not only establish self-reliance but to also assimilate to the
community. 120 In fact, the reason why the Convention extends rights, such as
the right to primary education, to the same standards as those available to the
host State’s citizens is because “schools are the most effective instruments of
assimilation.” 121 As a part of this process towards self-reliance, refugees are
113

See id.
See generally id.
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See UNHRC, supra note 20.
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meant to contribute to the State’s economy and become self-sufficient in order
to eventually rely less on State assistance. 122 According to the UNHCR,
naturalization involves a legal process where the refugee is progressively
granted rights similar to those of citizens, such as freedom of movement, access
to education and labour markets, public relief, health facilities, acquisition of
property, identity and travel documents. 123 The process eventually leads to
permanent residence and, in some cases, to citizenship. 124 The following two
Sections detail two processes of naturalization.
1. Naturalization as an Exceptional Durable Solution
The Convention aims for “durable solutions” by putting an end to the refugee
status. 125 These solutions could comprise of, voluntary repatriation, resettlement
in third countries or naturalization within host states. 126 Any such measure,
however, is left to the option of the individual refugees. This is the case unless
there has subsequently been a fundamental change in circumstances in the
refugees’ country of origin because of which he does not warrant further
international protection. Since the refugee does not need any further
international protection, the refugee can be mandatorily repatriated to the
refugee’s country of origin. This situation has been explained under Article 1C
Cessation Clauses. 127
As one would notice, the criteria for naturalization is available only under
exacting situations with voluntary repatriation to the refugee’s country of origin
being the most favourable solution. Barusitski explains that the international law
obligations states took upon themselves by becoming parties to the Convention,
does not oblige them to provide more than the refugee rights in case the
conditions in the country of origin turn safe “within a reasonable time period.” 128
This proposal seems to offer some middle ground. It does so by noting that a
and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons - Memorandum by the Secretary-General,
E/AC.32/2 (Jan. 3, 1950).
122
See UNHCR, supra note 78.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Sadako Ogata, Foreword to Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137.
126
UNHCR, CONCLUSIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
1975-2017 (CONCLUSION NO. 1-114) 47 (2017).
127
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (“This Convention
shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if . . . he has voluntarily re-established
himself in the country which he left or outside of which he remained owing to fear of persecution”).
128
See M. Barutciski, Involuntary Repatriation when Refugee Protection is no Longer Necessary: Moving
Forward after the 48th Session of the Executive Committee, 10(1/2) INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 236, 245 (1998).
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refugee may have, in accordance with the framework of the Convention, gained
the higher standard of attachment with the host state. As such, it would be unfair,
after the passage of a reasonable period of time, to repatriate individuals to their
country of origin. Sometimes the host state might even recognize these rights
before the expiry of such “reasonable time period” on the ground that the past
persecution suffered by the refugee might have been so horrific, that it would be
against humanitarian considerations to send individuals to their country of
origin. 129 The HRC and UNHCR have both observed that any return must be
dignified and not amount to arbitrary interference with the family life of the noncitizens. 130 This is so in instances where the non-citizen may have dependent
children who by reason of being stateless or, otherwise being born into the
territory have already acquired citizenship of the host state. 131 Notice, however,
that a grant of residence does not automatically translate into a right to acquire
nationality. Thus, habitual or durable legal residence is a necessary precursor to
naturalization. The following section deals with this assertion.
2. Naturalization Only Subsequent to Assimilation and Integration
Under Article 34 of the Refugee Convention, the host State is expected to
facilitate the process of naturalization “as far as possible” including through the
reduction of the costs involved and expedition of proceedings. 132 On one hand,
Blay and Tsamenyi argue that Article 34 “effectively requires the States to give
the refugees more favorable treatment than the States would normally give to
other aliens.” 133 On the other hand, Weiss and Robinson opine that the State is

129
Lal v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 255 F.3d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n expression of
humanitarian considerations that sometimes past persecution is so horrific that the march of time and the ebb
and flow of political tides cannot efface the fear in the mind of the persecuted.”)
130
UNHRC, supra note 69.
131
See, e.g., Baker v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R 817 (Can.); Winata v. Australia, UNHRC Comm. No.
930/2000, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (July 26, 2001) (upholding a challenge to deportation order by the
Australian state of two stateless persons with an Australian citizen child, discussing how the discretion of the
state in enforcing its immigration policy will be arbitrary in case the applicants have been present for a long time
period, in this case for over 14 years and their son, born and schooled within the territory that might have been
adequate in developing social relationships); Madafferi v. Australia, UNHRC Comm. No. 1011/2001, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/81/D/1011/2001 (July 26, 2004) (showing that the Applicants had been present in the country for a
long period and to return to a society whose language their minor children did not know and which was alien to
them would be arbitrarily and the parents could not have been deported individually either owing to the minority
of the children).
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Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (article 34).
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Samuel Blay & Martin Tsamenyi, Reservations and Declarations under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 2 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 527, 542 (1990).
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only under a dual “recommendation,” a general one to facilitate the assimilation
and integration and a specific one to reduce costs and expedite the process. 134
Under the Refugee Convention, no State is under an obligation to promote
enfranchisement, for instance, by enacting refugee-specific provisions over
naturalization. 135 Similarly, neither is a refugee under any obligation to accept a
specific process over another. 136 Nonetheless, this is not to say that a refugee, as
any other foreign non-resident, will be free from disqualification from an
assessment of their naturalization application if shown that the refugee has
completed the substantive requirements for naturalization. Apart from the
administrative formalities in submission of the application and the decision,
there appears to be no difference in consideration of a foreign non-resident’s
application and that of a refugee’s. 137
Although, there are instances where the host States absolutely refuse to allow
refugees access to naturalization. For instance, under Ugandan laws, a refugee
is entitled to naturalization as per the provisions of the Constitution. 138 However,
the Constitution itself limits naturalization to those who have “voluntarily
migrated” or provides for extensively long periods of residence. 139 These would
not only amount to breach of the minimalist commitments towards
naturalization discussed above, but also the more substantial provisions on nondiscrimination framed under Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR that apply to all
individuals without exceptions. This is so because there are no “reasonable
grounds” for withholding of such persons access to the procedure, apart from

134
See HATHAWAY, supra note 21, at 981, 984 n.313 (discussing that assimilation “is used not in the usual
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cases where refugees objectively or subjectively may be able to return to their
country of origin. 140
The naturalization of a refugee is not a separate endeavor, or as Hathaway
explains, it is not an “alternative solution.” 141 Rather the rights structure under
the Refugee Convention itself facilitates this process. 142 Once all rights as
contemplated, or the integration in the community is achieved, the refugee
ceases to be a “Refugee” under the cessation clause in Article 1(C) (3) and is
now able to participate in the political life of the host state. 143 Hathaway’s
opinion, combined with the fact that the provision on naturalization is placed at
the extreme end of the Refugee Convention, hints at the linear progression of
rights. 144 That is to say, naturalization is possible only once the refugee has
undergone each level of attachment along the rights spectrum. 145 As mentioned
before, a higher level of rights goes hand-in-hand with a higher level of
integration in the host state. The highest level of integration being that of a legal
habitual or durable residence. This is also in agreement with the legal
proposition that the exercise of diplomatic protection by a state can be exercised
in the case of refugees and stateless persons—as long as they are lawfully and
habitually resident within the territory. 146
Although, international law does provide for exceptional situations where a
refugee does not need to move through every stage of attachment. For instance,
international law recommends that children born on the territories of another
state who would otherwise be stateless, be considered for an automatic
acquisition of nationality through registration, after verification through
statelessness determination procedures. 147 Similarly, refugees who are meant for
resettlement in member States, such as Canada, need not go through an
additional verification procedure. 148 This is because, unlike asylum seekers,
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their claims have already been verified in the country of first asylum. 149 Thus,
they enter the territory with residence permits and are immediately granted
permanent residence- which eventually allows them to apply for
naturalization. 150
Thus, India’s proposed amendment directly grants asylum seekers the rights
to claim citizenship without further verification and having to establish a legal
habitual or durable residence. This appears to violate international legal
standards. But what recourse does international law provide? Individuals,
including refugees and stateless persons, are entitled to bring complaints before
treaty bodies such as the HRC or the CERD over grounds of discrimination
without any reasonable basis, during admittance or naturalization. But the law
provides no further recourse over challenging the naturalization of those falsely
seeking benefits under the Convention definition within its territory.
Moreover, the law does not discuss whether the actions of the asylum State
constitute a breach of any duty owed towards its own citizens. 151 It additionally
enlists any integration plan as “good practice” and recommends states to
facilitate integration at the local level. 152 Likewise, the Llubjana Principles and
the Bolzano Guidelines ask States to refrain from any act that could potentially
confer citizenship upon foreign non-resident nationals en masse over grounds of
sovereignty and the commitment to uphold neighbourly relationships, implying
that there are no binding obligations imposed upon them to do the same. 153 The
Nottebohm judgement also only generally mentions that other states are under
no obligation to recognize the conferment of nationality without any genuine
link, or as in this case, a legal habitual and durable residence.
CONCLUSION
Although the Citizenship Amendment Act superficially appears to only
focus on granting citizenship, it implicates the Refugee Convention and the
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rights of refugees. The foreseeable consequence of the CAA would result in a
curve of all asylum seekers from identified countries who practice a targeted
religion—violating the principles of non-discrimination that apply to all asylum
seekers. At the same time, unverified asylum claims do not imply that
individuals need certain protections, especially when an individual maintain
their national status. Therefore, the CAA is a concerning development because
international law provides that naturalization rights are only limited to those who
can exhibit ties to a State, which in the case of refugees amounts to a showing
of legal habitual and durable residence. But neither the refugee laws nor the
general principles of international law provide any guidance over a challenge to
the conferral of citizenship as an offensive recourse. The law does not discuss
whether the State, through its conferral, breaches any duty towards its own
citizens to accept and integrate only those with identified protection needs.
Looking forward, this Article ends with an inquiry into further research: what
latitude does international law truly provide to States in refugee related matters,
whether a refugee’s way towards naturalization is available only on the
establishment of a length of legal stay and negligible hopes of return, or other
extraneous considerations? Considering the potential negative implications
associated with certain integrations, what additional duties does the host State
owe any to its citizens?

